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ver the last two hundred years there have been
immense changes both in how societies view
women and what women do relative to men. How
and why this has happened has been the subject of a
vast literature which I will not even begin to attempt
to review here. Instead, I would like to address, at
least in part, the question of whether changes in cul-
ture – by which I mean changes in a set of social
beliefs and understandings – played an important
role in this transformation.
Both economists and non-economists alike may be
tempted to dismiss this question or stop reading
this article at this point. The latter may consider
the answer as evidently “yes” whereas the former
may, in general, consider it a question that – like
the existence of God – economics is not designed
to answer. Yet, as hopefully this issue of DICE
REPORT makes clear, some economists have late-
ly made headway in studying the role of culture.1
Culture, we would argue, and its role in questions
relating to growth, technological progress, trade,
crime, etc. – i.e., in contributing to any of the phe-
nomena that economists find of interest – can
and should be studied with the entire array of rig-
orous techniques and methodology available to
economists.
Does culture play an independent role in traditional
economic issues? Let me create a straw-man (we can
call him homo materialisticus) as a way to clarify the
way in which I would like to think about this ques-
tion. Homo materialisticus believes that the great
economic changes that the world has seen are basi-
cally a result of technological or other material
change (e.g., the discovery of new lands). Culture –
societal beliefs – exists and changes over time and
space, but it is basically some flotsam of the mind
with no independent role other than reflecting the
underlying material reality.So,yes,attitudes towards
women have changed, but this has been a reflection
of technological change that altered what women do
and thus how we think of them.It is this mindset that
the work I discuss below seeks to challenge by pro-
viding evidence to disprove it.
It is not my intention here to propose and develop a
more sophisticated model in which culture, institu-
tions, history, technology and the general material
environment interact to determine outcomes and
how they all change over time. Nor will I attempt to
answer the grand question of the role occupied by
culture in transforming women’s place in the econo-
my.Instead,I will review some of the work that I and
coauthors have done to show that cultural variations
that exist over space matter to economic outcomes,
particularly women’s market work. If differences in
culture matter,then it is not too much of a leap from
there to thinking that changes in culture must matter
as well.
How might culture affect women’s participation in
the formal labor market (working for a wage)? Note
that this is a very different question than asking
about how culture affects whether women work –
historically, women have always worked. Restricting
ourselves to the last one hundred or so years, over
this time a dramatic change occurred in the types of
work that women do relative to men and, particular-
ly for married women,in their ability and inclination
to work for a wage outside the home.It is illustrative
to use numbers from the US to make this point as
they span a long time period: the labor force partici-
pation in market work of white, married women
between the ages of 25 and 44 who were not in agri-
culture increased from about 3 percent in 1880 to
over 73 percent in 2000.2
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There have also been important changes in the work habits of sin-
gle women, but in terms of labor force participation and hours
worked (the easiest things to measure), it is the change in married
women’s labor supply that is the most dramatic.At any moment in time, whether a (married)
woman worked outside the home depended upon
other things, on social (and individual) beliefs.
These beliefs ranged from those concerning a
woman’s productivity, or regarding her emotional
stability or intellectual ability or ambition, as well
as concerns about her welfare, her marriage’s sta-
bility or her children’s welfare if she worked.These
beliefs – these social anxieties – along with the asso-
ciated social rewards and punishments from work-
ing have all been part of the social context in which
women made their work decisions. Did this social
context play a real role in influencing women’s
work decisions, however, or were these decisions
simply based on the economic environment with
the social narrative above playing an insignificant
role?  Below I will attempt to answer a modest ver-
sion of this question by reviewing some recent work
that shows that culture appears to play an impor-
tant role in determining how much women work
outside the home.
Taking what I have called an “epidemiological”
approach to the analysis of culture, my research
studies the descendants of immigrants from various
countries of ancestry but who live in the same coun-
try to separate the role of culture from that of the
technological and institutional environment. The
reasoning underlying this approach is similar to that
employed by epidemiologists. Much as epidemiolo-
gists might attempt to distinguish between the
genetic versus environmental contributions to, for
example, differences in the rate of heart disease
between Japanese and American men by studying
Japanese immigrants and their descendants in the
US and comparing them to others living in the US,
one can use a similar approach to distinguish
between the impact of beliefs and the environment
in women’s work behavior. In the case of heart dis-
ease,finding convergence in the incidence of the dis-
ease between Japanese descendants and others
would tend to support the theory that an environ-
mental agent is responsible for the health differ-
ences between Japan and the US.3 Similarly,if immi-
grants from a diverse range of countries and their
descendants in the US display the same economic
behavior, this would tend to lend support to a more
“materialist” view of the world.
The use of an epidemiological approach is consider-
ably more complex in economics than in medicine.
There are many reasons why cultural differences may
fail to play an important role in the life of immigrants
or their descendants and yet be a very important
determinant of behavior. First and foremost, culture
is socially constructed and maintained. Even if
Japanese cultural beliefs about how women should
behave may have a major influence on women’s work
habits in Japan, the impact of these beliefs on Japa-
nese women in the US may be significantly weaker
since they occur in a social setting in which the social
rewards and sanctions are different.4  Second, immi-
grants are not randomly selected individuals from
their country of ancestry and thus may not possess
the “average” social beliefs.Third, although we study
second-generation individuals in order to minimize
the importance of differences in language ability and
other immigrant “shocks”, this strategy will be weak-
ened by immigrant assimilation and thus tends to
bias the findings against culture.Thus, altogether this
strategy is biased against finding that culture plays a
role in economic outcomes and hence can only be
convincingly used to provide evidence that culture
matters rather than to disprove it.
In Fernández and Fogli (2006; 2009) and Fernández
(2007), we study the work and fertility outcomes of
second-generation American women in 1970. Using
the 1970 US Census, we construct a sample of mar-
ried women (as this is the group of women for which
one finds interesting differences in labor supply)
between the ages of thirty and forty, and distin-
guished by the characteristic of having parents that
were born outside the US.This results in a sample of
over 6,750 married women from 25 countries of
ancestry around the world.
An important challenge is how to measure culture.
In Fernández and Fogli (2009) we use the female
labor force participation (LFP) rate in 1950 in the
father’s home country. This variable reflects the
beliefs that women held in 1950,in the father’s home
country,regarding the desirability of working,as well
as employers’ views towards employing women. It
can also reflect social attitudes that may facilitate or
hinder working (e.g., by affecting the availability of
high-quality child care), as well as the degree of sup-
port within the family for a working wife, and of
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course local market and production conditions that
determine wages as well as women’s investment in
human capital that determine their productivity.
Thus the aggregate participation of women in the
work force reflects culture, institutions and the eco-
nomic environment.
The critical argument for using female LFP in 1950 as
a proxy for culture is that,in the context of explaining
the behavior of second-generation American in the
US,it will not be contaminated by the contribution of
institutions and the economic environment that influ-
ence its level in the country of ancestry. The asym-
metry between culture and the other contributors
rests on their degree of “portability.”That is, whereas
the cultural component of culture may be transmitted
from parents (and perhaps the wider immigrant com-
munity) to their daughters (and reinforced perhaps
by the immigrant community) and thus affects
the beliefs of second-generation
American women in 1970, the
local material and institutional
conditions of the country of
ancestry in 1950 should not be
transferable. Thus, although we
don’t formally use the female
LFP variable as an instrument,in
order for it to be a valid proxy for
culture in our context, it needs to
fulfill the same conditions. In
particular, it should not have any
direct effect on how much these
second-generation American
women work in the US other
than through beliefs.
Figure 1 reproduces the raw cor-
relation found in Fernández and
Fogli (2009) between the average
number of hours worked per
week by women of different
countries of ancestry in 1970 in
the US and the 1950 female LFP
in these countries.As can be seen,
there is a positive correlation
between these two variables.
Before turning to the question of
whether this relationship is cau-
sal, I will review additional evi-
dence on the link between culture and women’s work.
In Fernández (2007), I employ the epidemiological
approach to study the relationship between culture and
work, using social attitudes instead. I used the answers
to questions posed in the World Value Survey (WVS)
in 1990–91 that reveal attitudes towards women’s
work. In particular, individuals were asked to answer
whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed or
strongly disagreed with the following statements:
1. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working
for pay;
2. Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an
independent person.
There is a great deal of variation across the European
countries in how individuals reacted to these state-
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Source: World Value Survey, 1990.
BEING A HOUSEWIFE IS AS FULFILLING AS WORKING FOR PAY
% disagree or strongly disagree (WVS 1990)
Figure 2
5 The sample was restricted to European
countries as the questions were not posed
to the other countries in our US Census
sample (with the exception of two others).disagreed or disagreed with statement 1 above by
country. The number ranged from a bit over 20 per-
cent in Turkey to slightly over 50 percent in Portugal.
Rather than study whether the attitudes expressed
by individuals across countries help explain the
cross-country variation in women’s work in Europe,
I used the epidemiological approach and investigat-
ed instead whether the cross-country variation in
attitudes was capable of explaining variation in the
work behavior of the second-generation American
women (with European ancestry) in 1970.Note that,
once again, this strategy relied on using country-of-
ancestry variables to explain why women work dif-
ferent amounts in the same country (the US) – hence
eliminating other factors that could influence cross-
country variation in women’s labor market out-
comes. For this to be a valid proxy for culture, we
need for the attitudes expressed by individuals
across European countries in 1990 should not have
a direct influence on the work habits of second-gen-
eration American women in the US in 1970 other
than through the common beliefs that may underlie
both variables. Figure 3 shows the raw correlation
between the average number of hours worked per
week in 1970 in the US by women of different coun-
tries of ancestry and the percentage of individuals
who in that same country in 1990 disagreed with
statement 1.6
I next turn to the main challenge faced by this
research strategy – the concern that an omitted vari-
able is driving the positive correlations shown in
Figures 1 and 3. As a fundamental first step, all the
regression analyses included a
set of characteristics of married
women that might vary in a sys-
tematic fashion across groups of
ancestry. In particular, we con-
trolled for the woman’s age and
education as well as the age and
education of her husband and
her husband’s total income.
Furthermore, we included fine
geographic controls (over 100
standard metropolitan area dum-
mies) to capture potentially sys-
tematic differences in the resi-
dence pattern of different ethnic
groups might reside which could
then be correlated with different
market conditions.The correlation remained positive
and statistically and economically significant.7
Despite the inclusion of individual-level controls, it
remained possible that an omitted variable could be
responsible for the results. If this variable is not cul-
ture than it needed to directly affect either the mate-
rial cost or the benefit from working. The main sus-
pect would be, therefore, unobserved human capital.
That is, although we were controlling for a woman’s
education, some aspects of human capital might not
be captured by this variable.
In Fernández and Fogli (2009) we investigated in
depth the challenge posed by unobserved human
capital. One possible avenue was that parental edu-
cation differed systematically by country-of-ancestry
and that work behavior of daughters reflected the
transmission of this by channels not captured by for-
mal education.As the US Census did not have infor-
mation on parental education, we constructed prox-
ies for parental human capital by obtaining the edu-
cation level of the parent’s immigrant group from
the 1940 Census. We also used the General Social
Survey, which contained information on parental
education, to obtain an alternative (unfortunately,
significantly smaller) sample of second-generation
women. Furthermore, to attempt to capture quality
as well as quantity measures of parental human cap-
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ital, we included Hanushek and Kimko’s (2000)
international test-based measures of quality differ-
entials in education across countries. The relation-
ship between the cultural proxy and hours worked
survived all these tests.Lastly,and perhaps most con-
vincingly, we showed that the cultural proxy – i.e.,
female LFP in the country of ancestry in 1950 – had
no explanatory power for the wages received by the
second-generation women. Thus, if there were
human capital differences that varied systematically
by country of ancestry, these were not showing up in
wages which robs the unobserved human capital
story of most of its plausibility. Our analysis con-
cluded that it was unlikely that unobserved human
capital was driving our results.
I conclude this discussion by reminding the readers
that this literature is in its infancy.The key questions
of how culture is determined, how it changes, how it
influences and is influenced by institutions are only
just beginning to be studied. A central, simple, yet
powerful, insight from economics is that people
respond to incentives.These incentives,however,are,
at least in part, culturally (socially) determined and
thus tend to be self-perpetuating. Nonetheless, the
consequences of innovations are often unpredictable
and new information and learning can challenge and
test societal beliefs, forcing them to evolve.8 Indeed,
in a constantly changing world such as ours over the
last two hundred years,the view of culture as static is
particularly mistaken.
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